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U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd were 
separated by institutional contexts, relative power positions, and decades in time. 
However, each confronted a similar dilemma – of reconciling rhetorical idealism with 
policy practicalities. Building on insights from studies of the U.S. rhetorical presidency, 
we offer a framework highlighting the tensions between ‘outside’ moral appeals which 
raise expectations and the ‘inside’ technocratic rhetoric of policy administration. We 
argue that norms encouraging moral appeals have come to transcend institutional 
differences between ‘presidential’ and ‘prime ministerial’ systems. Despite the different 
contexts of the Wilson-era League of Nations debate and the Rudd-era carbon tax-Kyoto 
controversies, we argue that pressures to ‘speak in two voices’ engendered credibility 
gaps that undermined each leader’s congressional and parliamentary support. In 
concluding, we suggest that this analysis supports a more nuanced appreciation of the 
rhetorical imperatives that can impede policy efficiency – and the need to limit 
tendencies to either populist or intellectual partisanship.   
 
I. Introduction and Overview 
How do different types of rhetoric enable or impede change? To what extent do 
efforts by leaders to construct moral challenges engender ‘revolutions of rising 
expectations’ that are undercut by more technocratic or transactional rhetoric?  We 
consider here two leaders whose policy ambitions were frustrated by ‘credibility gaps’ 
between their ‘outside’ popular rhetoric and ‘inside’ intellectual and policy deliberations: 
While U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd were 
separated by institutional contexts of presidential and prime ministerial settings, as well 
as relative power positions and decades of international and domestic change, they 
confronted a shared dilemma of balancing moral appeals with practical politics. In 
seeking U.S. entry into World War I, Wilson (1917b) laid down the rhetorical gauntlet, 
setting the U.S. on a crusade to make the world ‘safe for democracy.’ Yet, these 
ambitions would be undermined as tensions at the Paris Peace talks in 1919 and 
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congressional opposition impeded U.S. entry into the League of Nations, presaging the 
difficulties of the interwar era. Similarly, in 2007, Kevin Rudd would characterize 
climate change as the ‘great moral challenge of our generation’ as he urged an emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) which might provide an example to other states (Koutsoukis, 
2007). Echoing Wilson, Rudd’s pledge would be frustrated by parliamentary opposition 
and multilateral resistance at the Copenhagen summit in 2009, contributing to his 
decision to postpone the ETS and playing a part in his eventual political demise. 
In highlighting these parallels, we advance three related arguments about the 
challenges to rhetorical leadership in modern democracies. Firstly, advancing on recent 
Historical Institutionalist scholarship (Thelen, 1999; Orren and Skowronek, 2004), we 
argue that tensions across the ‘social distribution of knowledge’ (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966) can provide a source of policy instability, as emotionally-grounded speech 
conflicts with more cognitive – e.g., diplomatic, coalitional, or intellectual – rhetoric in 
ways that can cause credibility gaps, instability and crisis. Put differently, we echo 
Tulis’s (1987, pp. 9-13) critiques of ‘institutional partisanship’ with a similar focus on the 
costs of ‘intellectual partisanship’. More precisely, we suggest that overconfidence in 
intellectual deliberation as an alternative to populist excess obscures the costs of 
intellectual insularity and benefits of ambiguity as a source of legitimacy and flexibility 
(Goodnight 1982; Best 2005; Bostdorff  2008). Secondly, we argue that such tensions 
pose a challenge for all democratic leaders, regardless of the system of government in 
which they operate. More specifically, we build on Tulis’s analysis of the American 
‘rhetorical presidency’ by suggesting that Westminster system prime ministers – though 
acting in completely different institutional contexts - face the same rhetorical challenges 
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as presidents (Grube, 2010). Thirdly, we argue that a clearer understanding of the need 
for democratic leaders to engage in both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ rhetoric can provide a 
more complete and nuanced picture of the rhetorical challenges that democracies place on 
their leaders. Outwardly powerful and committed leaders are shown to lack the power to 
manage major change unless they can successfully balance populist and intellectual 
rhetorics in a way that avoids credibility gaps from either vantage.  
Having developed these theoretical arguments, we shift to an empirical focus on 
the limits to affective appeals by Wilson in the League debate and Rudd in advancing a 
climate change policy. In Wilson’s case – advancing on Tulis’s account – we situate his 
difficulties in the context of Progressive-era thought, as his rhetoric conflicted with 
senatorial and great power politics. In the Rudd case, we similarly situate his difficulties 
in tensions between the moral appeal of his arguments and parliamentary and multilateral 
(e.g., Copenhagen) tensions over climate change policies. In the conclusion, we stress the 
implications of tensions between outside and inside rhetoric for debates over global 
governance, comparative politics, and the interplay of populist and technocratic excesses.  
   
II. The Sociology of Political Rhetoric – Sentiment, Strategy, and Instability 
Over recent decades, debates over institutional change have been shaped by 
rationalist frameworks which presume that agents make efficient use of information 
(Muth, 1961; North, 1990). While not denying the utility of rationalist assumptions, we 
argue that they obscure the constitutive nature of rhetoric, the scope for deliberative 
instability and the endogenous sources of crises (Blyth, 2002; Widmaier, 2004). To 
redress these shortcomings, we argue that a broadly institutionalist stress on the 
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impediments to deliberative efficiency is better suited to highlighting the different types 
of rhetoric that constitute popular beliefs, intellectual frameworks, and which can 
themselves cause policy instability. More formally, we argue for the importance of 
tensions across a ‘social distribution of knowledge,’ positing that rhetorical appeals 
which abstract away too far from either intellectual or popular settings can give rise to 
credibility gaps and eventual instability.  
 
From Institutionalist Approaches to the Social Distribution of Knowledge 
In recent decades, approaches to Comparative and International Political 
Development have been shaped by rationalist approaches which highlight the efficiency 
of varied agents – most importantly coalitional agents (Gourevitch, 1986) or norm 
entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) in making use of information. Yet, even as 
such approaches provide useful insights, they underrate the scope for disruption, reducing 
instability and crises to deus ex machina-styled exogenous shocks. Partly to redress these 
oversights, recent years have seen the emergence of a broad Historical Institutionalist 
approach highlighting the Weberian-styled pathologies which generate instability 
(Thelen, 1999; Orren and Skowronek, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Characterizing 
such perspectives, Kathleen Thelen (1999) argues that they stress the ways in which the 
‘layering’ of ideas and institutional orders can impede policy cohesion. Where ideas and 
institutions provide the underpinnings of policy orders, successive orders may interact in 
destabilizing fashions over time. To the extent that such institutional accumulation 
mounts over time, Thelen (1999, p. 382) argues that ‘the various pieces do not 
necessarily fit together into a coherent, self-reinforcing, let alone functional, whole.’ In 
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this light, a key source of change comes from the interplay of dysfunctional institutional 
orders. Or, as Thelen (1999, p. 383) puts it, ‘change comes from the interactions of 
different institutional orders within a society,’ as they combine in ways that alternatingly 
give rise to instability or enable new possibilities.  
With respect to specific concerns for policy rhetoric, this stress on the 
juxtaposition of institutional logics can be seen most clearly in studies of the American 
presidency. In particular, Jeffrey Tulis’ seminal work on the rhetorical presidency has 
created an increasingly vast field of scholarship seeking to interrogate how and why the 
U.S. rhetorical presidency communicates (Medhurst, 1996; Friedman  2007; Garsten 
2007; Tulis 2007; Stuckey, 2010; Friedman and Friedman 2012). Tulis’ introduction of 
the rhetorical presidency into modern scholarship re-cast our understanding of the 
institutional shape of the U.S. presidency itself. Neustadt’s (1960) ‘power to persuade’ 
was revealed as being underpinned by an institutionalized ‘need to persuade’ in order to 
successfully exercise democratic leadership. In the system of shared power enshrined in 
the U.S. constitution, the rhetorical presidency has provided the key avenue through 
which a president can go over the head of Congress and seek to connect directly with the 
American people.  
More specifically, Tulis casts the U.S. constitutional order a ‘layered text’ in 
characterizing an incomplete transformation of norms governing presidential speech. 
First, describing a foundational ‘Old Way,’ Tulis (1987, p. 27) stresses the framers’ 
desire that deliberation be exercised in the legislative setting, as they feared ‘the danger 
that a powerful executive might pose… if power were derived from the role of popular 
leader.’ In particular, they feared that such leadership might devolve into demagoguery, 
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relying on appeals to emotion and popular passions. While Tulis (1987, p. 30) concedes 
that the framers lacked ‘a straightforward answer’ to the problem of demagoguery, he 
argues that they addressed it indirectly by assigning the key deliberative role to the 
legislature. To be sure, a cursory understanding of American politics suggests that this 
order has been since supplanted. In this light, Tulis secondly characterizes a second order 
or ‘New Way’ by citing the influence of the late nineteenth century doctrinal critique 
advanced by Woodrow Wilson, who argued in his Congressional Government that only 
the president stood capable of identifying a national interest. However, Tulis (1987, pp. 
17-18) further notes that while Wilson’s critique overlaid the founding vision, it did not 
displace it. In this light, the contemporary rhetorical presidency is ‘buffeted by two 
constitutions,’ leading presidents to speak in two voices as they play both a behind-the-
scenes role in intellectual and transactional debates and a public one in providing 
‘continuous presidential leadership of public opinion.’  
Highlighting the implications of this layering, Tulis addresses key inefficiencies 
in U.S. policymaking. First, Tulis (1987, p. 46) argues that these contradictory rhetorical 
norms are a source of recurring credibility gaps that plague public discourse, as 
presidents suffer a role confusion in which their appeals to broad ideals ‘fashioned for all’ 
are undermined by the qualifications that shape in-government interactions and so are not 
‘available to all.’ Put differently, they face pressures to speak out of ‘both sides of their 
mouth’ in ways that can spur the appearance of instability. Secondly, in the absence of 
opportunities for refined deliberation, Tulis (1987, pp. 178-179) suggests that presidents 
will increasingly seek to cast events as unprecedented crises to legitimate reform. Such 
appeals can in turn degrade the public’s ability to engage in more gradual policy 
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adjustment and prompt a broader ‘decay of political discourse,’ as deliberation is 
supplanted by ‘competition to please or manipulate the public.’ Tulis (1987, pp. 181) 
concludes that a paradoxical long term result of the routinization of crisis might be to 
‘make presidents less capable of leadership at any time,’ as it has impeded the ability of 
agents ‘to distinguish genuine from spurious crises,’ leaving the rhetorical presidency to 
be ‘the creator of crises, or pseudo-crises.’ Friedman (2007, p. 205) stresses this aspect of 
Tulis’s argument, warning that, as reliance on public rhetoric grows, leaders face 
pressures to make ‘problems	to	be	solved	by	some	new	law	[appear	to	be]...	urgent,	and	
the	proposed	law	must	be	made	to	seem	a	panacea,	if	the	public	is	to	be	mobilized	to	
back	the	new	law.	Consequently,	the	rhetoric	of	everyday	politics	is	now	characterized	
by	alarm	and	exaggeration	–	that	is,	of	untruth.’	Or,	as	Tulis	(1987,	p.	179)	puts	it,	‘The	
rhetorical	presidency	enhances	the	tendency	to	define	issues	in	terms	of	the	needs	of	
persuasion	rather	than	to	develop	a	discourse	suitable	for	the	illumination	and	
exploration	of	real	issues’.	
Yet, while there is much to commend in Tulis’s analysis, we argue that it remains 
limited in three ways: First, we argue that it overrates the specificity of these dilemmas to 
American politics. To the extent that all political systems are shaped by a social 
distribution of knowledge or intellectual division of labor, tensions are likely to emerge 
between rhetoric meant for the public and more refined ‘in-group’ settings. Secondly, 
even as Tulis (1987, pp. 181) at times does seek a balanced tone in acknowledging the 
merit of public engagement – conceding that the rhetorical presidency can be ‘both good 
and bad’ – he ultimately views the social distribution of knowledge through an 
intellectually partisan lens. From this perspective, emotional appeals and public 
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engagement disrupt intellect, and intellection refinement restores stability. The result is a 
sort of a ‘rationalist lite’ analysis, reflecting what Sharon Krause (2008, p. 2) terms a 
liberal tendency to ‘betray a familiar fear about affect, which is that our passions will 
impugn the impartiality on which deliberation in matters of justice ought to rest’. In the 
process, Tulis underrates the ways in which what Jacqueline Best (2005) termed a 
‘constructive ambiguity’ can help reconcile more discrete policy differences – a dynamic 
which has also been noted by presidential scholars, as when Bostdorff (2008, p. 109) 
posits the importance of a “strategic ambiguity” in the construction of the Truman 
Doctrine. Indeed, in his historical examples, Tulis (1987, pp. 147-173; 193-202) 
disproportionately highlights the costs of policy oversimplification – e.g., in the 
Kennedy-Johnson era ‘War on Poverty’ in subverting the deliberative process (Zarefsky 
1986). In this context, however, he overlooks the equal potential for intellectual hubris – 
e.g., on the part of ‘best and brightest’ economists of the Kennedy era. As Best (2005) 
has argued, miod-1960s intellectual claims that a “New Economics” would enable 
macroeconomic fine tuning were premised on an excess of technocratic abstraction that 
was every bit as prone to raise expectations as Johnson’s public rhetoric regarding the 
potential to “cure” or “prevent” poverty. Third and finally, given bias toward intellectual 
efficiency, Tulis lacks a sense of the ways in which emotional and intellectual excesses 
interact over time. In this way, in a manner not dissimilar to psychological or institutional 
efforts regarding ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972) or policy pathologies (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004), Tulis identifies dysfunctional possibilities, but not the conditions 
under which they might intensify.  
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The Social Distribution of Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Ambiguity Aversion and Credibility Gaps 
To redress these oversights, we provide a social psychological context for the 
analysis of policy rhetoric, drawing on recent work highlighting the ways in which shared 
emotional and intellectual biases can impede deliberation (Crawford, 2000; Ross, 2006). 
We more formally situate Tulis’s analysis in a sense of what Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) term the ‘social distribution of knowledge’ across the more ambiguous affective 
appeals that prefigure cognitive beliefs and interests. From this vantage point, ‘primary’ 
attitudes, or what ‘everybody knows’ about ‘maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of 
wisdom, values and beliefs’ provide key bases for the more refined beliefs acquired in 
‘secondary’ settings (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 65). This distinction has been 
paralleled across an array of settings, to be sure – as in Goodnight’s (1982) distinction 
between “technical” and “public” spheres of argument. Having drawn this distinction, we 
are then able to counter Tulis’s intellectual partisanship, highlighting ways in which 
intellectual or populist certitude can exacerbate credibility gaps and instability. 
 In developing this framework, we make two key assumptions. First, we assume 
that inevitably-ambiguous emotional predispositions shape intellectual beliefs and policy 
preferences. As Andrew Ross (2006, pp. 199-200) argues, emotional predispositions are 
‘inspired and absorbed before being chosen’ and ‘tinge our intellectual beliefs’ in ways 
that are ‘experienced by decision-makers and publics alike.’ Moreover, their ambiguous 
nature – as they are prone to varied interpretations – can provide a source of policy 
stability, sustaining consensus despite transactional and paradigmatic differences. Over 
time, such values can further acquire self-reinforcing momentums as they shape 
intellectual assumptions and coalitional perceptions. Where political rhetoric engages 
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such concerns, it cannot be taken as a reflection, or mask obscuring, unproblematic 
underlying ideas or interests. Instead, it predisposes agents toward the more refined 
beliefs that sustain ideas or interests. As William Connolly (1987, p. 151) has argued, 
such rhetoric works ‘to encourage or provoke participants to adopt specific orientations to 
political conduct’, elaborating that ‘[t]he terms “encourage” and “provoke” identify 
precisely the loose and open quality of these relationships” in contrast to ‘a more formal 
account [that] would gloss over uncertainties and ambiguities’. 
Secondly, to explain the conditions giving rise to such intellectual excesses, we 
employ a further assumption, holding that intellectual ‘norm entrepreneurs’ or members 
of professionally-defined epistemic communities may over time seek to limit the scope 
for ambiguity and emotional appeals in favor of paradigmatic refinement and ‘flights into 
reason.’ Where such agents engage in the precognitive repression – or exclusion from 
consciousness – of the emotional foundations of intellectual beliefs, we suggest that the 
resulting ‘split’ in the social distribution of knowledge can provide a key source of 
credibility gaps. Put differently, to the extent that emotional or qualitative appeals are 
ambiguous, shared tendencies to what Daniel Ellsberg (1961) termed ‘ambiguity 
aversion’ and a preference for formal or quantitative-styled evidence stands to engender 
inefficiency in the use of information and so ‘irrational choices.’ Indeed, as scholars like 
Daniel Kahneman (2011, pp. 8; 21) have argued, the exclusion of sentiment may be just 
as damaging as an excess of sentiment. Where ‘systematic errors’ reflect ‘the machinery 
of cognition rather than… the corruption of thought by emotion,’ intellectual biases may 
prevent agents from recognizing information at odds with paradigmatic expectations. 
Concern for such rigidity of course has an enduring pedigree, back to psychological 
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discussions of defense mechanisms like the ‘intellectualization’, as agents seek to limit 
emotionally complicated aspects of any situations. In this light, where Tulis lauds 
intellectualization, this obscures the ways in which it reduces efficiency in the use of 
information, and the potential for the reconstitution of state and societal interests. From 
this vantage – as noted above – even as Tulis highlighted the limits to popular rhetoric in 
constructing the War on Poverty, he also obscured the parallel intellectual excesses of 
macroeconomic policymakers. The problem was less too much populism than intellectual 
excesses. 
 Combining these assumptions, we highlight the ways in which ambiguous moral 
appeals enable stability, while intellectualization and ambiguity aversion can prove 
destabilizing. More specifically, we suggest that this enables an improved appreciation of 
the conditions that see consensus yield to credibility gaps: On the one hand, speaking to 
the affective bases of popular consensus, we suggest that broad appeals on behalf of 
moral agendas can enable policy legitimacy and adaptability: In terms of legitimacy, 
emotional appeals can predispose the public toward specific paradigmatic beliefs. In 
terms of adaptability, ambiguity can enable policy adjustment to unforeseen 
developments, while reducing the likelihood that inexplicable events will be seen as a 
betrayal of ideals or a spur to transactional or paradigmatic conflict. On the other hand, in 
terms of intellectual excesses, we suggest that where political agents or intellectual 
advisers abstract too from affective contexts, this can impede popular legitimacy and 
engender overconfidence in policy control: In terms of adaptability, paradigmatic 
certainty will obscure the need for policy adjustment. In terms of legitimacy, the resulting 
divergence of public and policy views risk credibility gaps which can engender crisis and 
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change. Taking these dynamics together, as Jacqueline Best (2005, p. 7) frames it, ‘too 
much ambiguity can be destabilizing, [but] too little can also be a problem’ as a policy 
regime whose principles ‘remain open to interpretation and negotiation can be stabilizing 
in a rapidly changing… environment,’ while epistemic closure impedes adjustment and 
foreshadows declining legitimacy.  
 
Methodological Concerns 
In highlighting these tensions, we structure our approach to build on work 
examining aspects of the ‘presidentialization’ of prime ministers in parliamentary 
systems as it has addressed the interplay of leadership and rhetoric across different 
systems of government (Bowles, King and Ross, 2007; Theakston, 2011). This work 
suggests that there are inherent rhetorical challenges posed to democratic leadership that 
transcend the institutional make-up of a polity. In a Westminster system, the institutional 
motivation for engaging in public rhetorical appeals is not readily apparent. In a 
Westminster parliament, the prime minister by definition has the numbers to gain 
parliamentary approval for their program, and a prime minister who does not retain the 
confidence of the parliament must resign. While there are undeniably nuances that 
militate against quite such a straightforward characterization, the central concept is part 
of the basis of representative parliamentary democracy. In theory, a Westminster prime 
minister has only to sway the parliament in order to get their program through. This raises 
the question of not only why prime ministers spend so much time and energy giving 
speeches outside the parliament itself, but also broader concerns for the efficiency of 
parliamentary government, and whether policy pathologies that emerged from the 
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rhetorical presidency may equally bedevil what Toye (2011) has termed the rhetorical 
prime ministership. 
In highlighting these continuities, we note that – despite different systems of 
government, electoral systems, and political institutions – the central challenges of 
rhetorical leadership are strikingly similar: In both systems, leaders must construct a 
feasible narrative which embodies emotive and public elements and then utilize ‘inside’ 
or technical rhetoric to shape and guide policy outcomes that are not incongruent with 
their wider rhetorical positioning. In each case, the tensions between these imperatives 
can prove destabilizing, producing swings in public perceptions. To develop these 
insights, we trace in the following accounts the evolution of U.S. and Australian debates 
over national interests with respect to President Woodrow Wilson’s effort to advance 
post-World War I collective security and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s efforts to address 
climate change. Over each case, we juxtapose the evolving context of pronouncements 
geared to wider audiences – stressing the popular contexts of Wilson’s and Rudd’s own 
ideas – with the more refined statements directed toward epistemic communities and 
coalitional or diplomatic agents. In order to test the underlying utility of the rhetorical 
leadership concept beyond the specific U.S. context examined by Tulis, we adopt a ‘least 
similar’ case design to test whether the same institutional constraints that shaped 
Wilson’s actions – as Tulis’s examplar of a rhetorical president – could equally shape the 
actions of an Australian prime minister nearly a century later. Indeed, these cases 
comprise two policy conflicts that not only allow for a ‘least similar’ case design, but also 
allow for an analysis of how intellectual partisanship – rather than populist excesses – in 
policy debates can be said to be a long-established problem of rhetorical leadership, 
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rather than merely a contemporary phenomenon. In the conclusion, we address 
theoretical and policy implications.  
 
III. Constructing Wilson’s Credibility Gap: From Exhortation to Exhaustion 
Over the early twentieth century, the rise of Progressive ideas provided an ethical 
basis for an expansion of America’s role as a great power and commercial actor. This 
could be seen at first more clearly in the economic realm, as Rooseveltian advocates of a 
‘New Nationalism’ urged the management of economic power, while Wilsonian 
advocates of ‘New Freedoms’ favored the dismantling of market power to enable 
harmonious competition. Significantly, speaking to the deep structuring effects of ethical 
predispositions, this difference paralleled itself in the realm of foreign policy, where a 
Rooseveltian approach to managing the balance of power countered a Wilsonian stress on 
the harmony of interests among states that stressed the need for supportive institutions. 
Initially, the differences between these views mattered less than the deeper accord on an 
expanded scope for foreign and economic policy. However, this constructive ambiguity 
would prove increasingly difficult to reconcile with the partisan and great power 
differences underlying Wilson’s vision of the League of Nations Treaty. While Wilson 
would seek to reconcile the demands of the ‘inside’ games of senatorial and global 
politics with the ‘outside’ game of public rhetoric, eventually the gap between these 
discourses became too great to bridge, and the defeat of the League Treaty would spur an 
isolationist backlash destined to last nearly two decades. 
 
Ethical Foundations: National and Individual  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy debates shifted to a more 
assertive stance, an approach in broad accord with the ethos underlying the Progressive 
movements. By the 1890s, the moment at which the U.S. could – as Washington had put 
it – ‘defy material injury from external annoyance’ had come, enabling U.S. 
policymakers to aspire to shape the evolution of global politics. Though varieties of 
Progressives differed over the precise nature of U.S. interests, support existed for an 
ambiguous blend of balance-of-power realism and crusading liberalism – often in support 
of the same policy actions. For example, U.S. entry into the Spanish-American War 
reflected both a realist-styled desire to exert a global influence and internationalist-styled 
calls for the liberation of Cuba. To be sure, through to the election of Woodrow Wilson to 
the presidency in 1912, foreign policy debates were secondary to economic matters. In 
one widely-noted comment, Wilson remarked to a colleague that ‘It would be an irony of 
fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign problems, for all my preparation 
has been in domestic matters’ (Cooper 2009, p. 282).  
However, to the extent that similar ethical predispositions shaped Progressive 
debates across the economic-foreign policy divide, this remark would prove something of 
an exaggeration. Indeed, Wilson himself had long woven his notions of social and legal 
order equally into discussions of domestic and international law. In a deep sense, his 
political worldview was shaped by Christian notions of Natural Law and as a force for 
ordering human interactions. As a scholar, he stressed the links between Christianity, the 
brotherhood of man, and the links between nations, arguing that ‘regardless of race or 
religion… fundamental, vital principles of right’ emanated from God to shape ‘the 
universal conscience of mankind,’ with nationhood depending on a state’s recognition of 
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these ‘common principles of right’ (Knock 1992, p. 8). Beyond Wilson, such views could 
be seen in millennial visions of the U.S. as a divinely favored nation, above the plane of 
balance-of-power styled politics or nationalist tensions, and so proving an enduring ‘blind 
spot’ in U.S. foreign policy (Hartz, 1955). 
In this light, while the August 1914 outbreak of hostilities in Europe would see 
Wilson’s focus shift to foreign policy, his instincts accord with his own brand of 
Progressivism, seeking at first to position the U.S. as a neutral arbiter that might advance 
a diplomatic solution. For example, in his January 1917 ‘Peace without Victory’ address, 
Wilson (1917a) combined a traditional American antipathy toward balance of power 
competition with support for an interstate ‘covenant’ to shape the postwar peace. 
Reframing the purposes of the conflict, Wilson argued that ‘[t]here must be, not a balance 
of power, but a community of power… [and] an organized common peace.’ Deploying 
Hamiltonian language to advance Jeffersonian principles, he argued that states should 
‘avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power,’ and 
instead unite ‘in the common interest… under a common protection.’ Taken as a whole, 
the speech foreshadowed key aspects of the Fourteen Points in its content and in its 
domestic response – marked by opposition from Isolationist Progressives like Idaho 
Republican Senator William Borah and his more realpolitik-visioned colleague 
Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Cooper 2009, pp. 372-373). 
Yet, in the immediate context, domestic and foreign reactions alike would be 
muted, as the January 1917 German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare 
eventually brought the U.S. into the conflict. In his April 1917 war message to congress, 
however, Wilson would continue to inveigh against power politic, arguing that the aim of 
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the U.S. would not simply be to reshape any balance of power, but rather to wage a war 
to make the world ‘safe for democracy.’ While much of the remainder of the year would 
be given over to domestic and international planning, Wilson and allies from academia 
and the media launched in September what would be termed the ‘Inquiry,’ cast by 
biographer John Milton Cooper as ‘a freestanding organization outside the State 
Department that would become famous as a covey of experts who brought knowledge 
and brainpower to the gathering of information and analysis about matters involved in a 
peace settlement’ (Cooper 2009, p. 419). The Inquiry’s research would subsequently 
provide a key basis for the January 1918 ‘Fourteen Points’ address. This was particularly 
true of the more specific points – e.g., regarding Poland, Russia and Alsace-Lorraine – 
which would matter less over the long term than Wilson’s (1918) concluding argument 
that a ‘general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small states alike.’  
To be sure, Wilson may have overrated the extent to which his principles were 
shared by the public. In November 1918, Wilson – just days before the armistice – 
appealed nationally for the return of the Democratic congress, and suffered defeat, with 
Republicans gaining majorities in the House and Senate (Cooper 2009, pp. 445). 
Nevertheless, Wilson would over the next year exude a continuing faith in the scope for 
his own rhetorical appeals. 
 
Credibility Gaps: International, Congressional and Public Rhetoric 
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To the extent that the essence of a credibility gap lies in the tensions between 
rhetoric directed toward ‘in group’ and ‘out-group’ agents, Wilson would effectively 
present to the public a quite different view of the League than that which was held in 
Europe or the Senate. The first signs of tension emerged on the international front, as 
Wilson’s call for a ‘peace without victory’ would collide with the actual treatment of the 
Germans by the allies, who would require that Wilson accept this adverse treatment as 
the cost of support for the League. Indeed, after the May 1919 unveiling of terms to the 
Germans, Wilson himself remarked to his Secretary of War Newton Baker ‘If I were a 
German I think I should never sign [the treaty]’ (Cooper 2009, p. 495). When the German 
delegation was presented with the terms, and given no option but to sign, the German 
foreign minister protested that ‘We are required to admit that we alone are war-guilty; 
such an admission on my lips would be a lie’ (Cooper 2009, p. 495). In this context, a 
credibility gap manifested itself almost immediately in Paris, where Wilson’s own aides 
voiced their disillusion to one another. In a moment of historical irony, Herbert Hoover 
and John Maynard Keynes encountered one another on the morning of May 7, each filled 
with concern over the terms of the treaty, and a number of Wilson’s staffers would resign 
in protest. Nevertheless, Wilson would continue to suppress his own criticisms of the 
Treaty, pointing to ‘the other leaders’ insistence on secrecy’ (Cooper 2009, p. 496). In a 
deeper sense, Wilson’s silence reflected the contradiction between a transactional 
settlement and an aspirational League. While recognizing the unfair nature of the legal 
settlement, Wilson held out for the possibility that the damage might be undone by the 
League. 
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This faith in the League was not shared in the Senate, where the League was seen 
as a potential infringement on U.S. sovereignty. Having invited no prominent 
Republicans to Paris, Wilson faced substantial Republican criticism over Article 10 of the 
League Covenant, which obligated members to ‘undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of 
all Members of the League.’ In confronting this challenge Wilson had essentially two 
directions in which he could move – toward appealing directly to the Senate and making 
compromises on the League Treaty – at the risk of alienating the wider public – or toward 
insisting on unqualified attachment to the Treaty ideals – and so by fall 1919 would 
increasingly resort to demagoguery in characterizing the alternative views of his 
opponents as lacking in principle (Hogan 2006). At his first address to the Senate upon 
returning from Paris in July 1919, Wilson sought to reconcile the two imperatives, 
warning that rejecting the Treaty would ‘break the heart of the world’ while exercising 
restraint in engaging opponents. Yet, in terms of senatorial reaction, the speech would 
fail, as Republicans denounced ‘Soap bubbles and a soufflé of rhetorical phrases’ 
(Cooper 2009, pp. 507-508). Nevertheless, Wilson would over the summer of 1919 
continue to engage the Senators. Ironically, in these settings, Wilson was forced to 
concede to his Republican adversaries that ‘the heart of the world’ would not be broken, 
at least not to the extent that many in Europe opposed the Treaty itself. Indeed, his private 
language in dealings with Republicans often stressed concerns for realpolitik and 
difficulties with European allies. For example, Wilson suggested to the members of the 
foreign relations committee at a private meeting in August 1919 that U.S. participation 
was essential to overcoming European skepticism.  
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However, such efforts ultimately failed, and Wilson subsequently embarked on a 
national tour, going ‘over the heads’ of congress to the public (Cooper 2009, pp. 518). In 
his ensuing public statements, Wilson argued that the world was desperate for the League 
and U.S. participation, even associating his Republican rivals with a spirit of 
‘Bolshevistic’ opportunism. In late September, Wilson collapsed, and returned to 
Washington – where the Treaty would ultimately be rejected, reflecting in no small part 
the ‘Old Way’ insulation of the Senators from the rhetorical pressures. In this immediate 
context, as Tulis (1987, p. 21) suggests, Wilson was confounded ‘by competing 
imperatives of the two constitutions.’ Yet, we stress that Wilson’s errors cannot be 
reduced to affective excesses, as affective influences on the part of his opponents – in 
their attachment to an ostensibly unambiguous realist verities – obscured the ways in 
which a desire to punish Germany would itself undermine European recovery – as 
famously argued by Keynes (1920): Secondly, to the extent that appeals during the 
Progressive era had led Americans to begin moving toward a broader definition of the 
national interest, Wilson’s dilemma was itself only possible because of prior affective 
shifts. Indeed, Wilson’s rhetoric eventually succeeded in advancing these impulses in 
American debates, and he himself would be reconstructed as a martyred visionary, and 
the post-World War II order would be shaped by a more balanced, if ambiguous 
“embedded liberal” variety of multilateralism (Ruggie 1982).  
 
IV. Constructing Rudd’s Credibility Gap: From Moral Challenge to Overthrow 
In a way that paralleled Wilson, Kevin Rudd’s approach to politics was animated 
by a broad sense of purpose, as he affirmed at the ‘Australia 2020’ summit in Canberra in 
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2008.  ‘I don’t want to explain to my kids, and perhaps their kids, too, that we failed to 
act; that we avoided the tough decisions; that we failed to prepare Australia for its future 
challenges’ (Stuart 2010, p. 1). Speaking specifically to environmental concerns, Rudd 
had campaigned in 2007 on a view of climate change as the ‘great moral challenge of our 
generation’ (Koutsoukis, 2007). Yet, over his term in office, the distance between Rudd’s 
rhetoric and what scholars (Buttel, 2000; Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Curran, 2011) have 
cast as a more prosaic ‘ecological modernization’ (EM) approach to climate change 
would prove a source of a mounting credibility gap. Paralleling Wilson, Rudd would 
succeed in raising domestic expectations, only to encounter parliamentary and global 
opposition to his plan. When Rudd abandoned the issue in early 2010, the result would be 
a public backlash that undermined support within his own party and led to his ultimate 
overthrow. However, as with Wilson, Rudd’s rhetoric had a ‘life of its own,’ presaging 
the Gillard government’s subsequent enactment of climate change legislation. 
 
Ethical Foundations: National and Individual 
Over the late 2000s, Rudd played a similar role to that of Wilson in advancing 
Australian debate over climate change. Each confronted similar tensions, as common 
attempts at advancing narratives of moral challenge conflicted with behind-the-scenes 
trade-offs. In this way, Rudd cast climate change as a ‘moral challenge’ in rhetorical 
terms while adhering to a more technocratic ecological modernization approach in 
practice. While the former elevates moral concerns over utilitarian-styled cost-benefit 
analyses, the latter seeks to manage a utilitarian environmental-economic trade-off while 
sustaining prevailing social and institutional contexts (Curran 2011, p. 1007). Initially, 
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however, the Liberal-National Coalition under John Howard (1996-2007) adopted neither 
a moral nor EM approach. Howard pursued instead what has been termed a policy of 
‘fossil fuel pragmatism’ that stressed the need to limit the relative gains that would be 
incurred by Australia’s unilateral acceptance of environmental obligations. This would be 
encapsulated in a ‘No Regrets’ policy, which held that Australia would accept no 
obligations that might impose relative costs on its economy – and so the government in 
particular refrained from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (Curran, 2011). However, this 
reluctance would in the mid-decade be undercut by an Australian drought that was widely 
seen as a consequence of global warming, and by the pressures of the approach of the 
2007 election, which together prompted the Howard government to move reluctantly to 
accept the reality of human-driven climate change (Christoff, 2005). 
Nevertheless, from 2006 into the November 2007 campaign, the Howard 
government would find itself ‘behind the curve’ of pressure emanating from the Labor 
Party. In particular, Labor Party Leader Kevin Rudd had assumed an increasing media 
profile, staking out the position of public intellectual in a way that saw him ‘go over’ 
parliamentary debates in efforts to reshape public sentiment. In the environmental 
context, this would be most clear in an essay published in The Monthly, in which Rudd 
(2006) addressed not only the issue of climate change, but also spoke to broader 
differences with Howard over the scope for religion and values in public life. Loosely 
paralleling Wilson, Rudd countered views of religion as solely pertaining to personal 
choice and morality. Instead, he argued for a broadened scope for religious values, meant 
‘not to be socially agreeable,’ but rather to ‘speak robustly to the state on behalf of those 
who cannot speak effectively for themselves.’ Addressing the implications for climate 
Widmaier and Grube 
 
 23 
change, Rudd argued that ‘the church’s increasing engagement on the environment - and 
specifically on global climate change’ reflected ethical imperatives, elaborating that ‘the 
planet cannot speak for itself. Nor can the working peoples of the developing world… 
although they are likely to be the first victims of… climate change.’ In this light, he 
argued that ‘[i]t is the fundamental ethical challenge of our age to protect the planet - in 
the language of the Bible, to be proper stewards of creation.’ Rudd (2006) concluded by 
bringing on a critique of the Howard government that ‘It is ethically indefensible for the 
current government to have spent the last decade not only refusing to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, but also actively working with the government of the U.S. to marginalise it.’  
Over the campaign, Rudd’s advanced position would relegate Howard to the 
persistent status of playing ‘catch-up.’ Most enduringly, as noted above, at a March 2007 
Labor Party Climate Change Summit, Rudd proclaimed climate change, ‘the great moral 
challenge of our generation,’ raising expectations of fast action. More specifically, in 
structuring the campaign itself, the Labor Party cast climate change as one of ‘three target 
areas,’ with industrial relations and education (Van Onselen and Senior 2008, p. 24). This 
pressure would push Howard by June 2007 to embrace climate change and promise ‘a 
world class emissions trading system more comprehensive, more rigorously grounded in 
economics, and with better governance than anything in Europe’ (Megalogenis 2012, p. 
383) In an address to the Melbourne Press Club a month later, Howard said: ‘it will 
provide a model for other nations to follow’ (Dreyfuss, 2007). Ultimately, Howard was 
incapable of convincing the public of his credibility on the issue, and – in a result that is 
best seen as overdetermined, coming at the end of four terms in office – would be turned 
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out by voters. Ironically, however, Rudd’s aggressive campaign would have implications 
for his own subsequent credibility, having raised expectations to a remarkable degree. 
 
Credibility Gaps: International, Parliamentary and Public Rhetoric 
In the campaign, Rudd had stressed the moral basis of Australian interests with 
respect to climate change. To be sure, his first official move in office would be to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol. However, in office, he would be forced to make legislative 
compromises, which would undercut his authority as a moral figure above politics. This 
would be particularly clear as he made early strategic decisions to adopt a more moderate 
plan, to appeal to the Liberals, despite the risk of alienating the Australian Greens. 
Indeed, the trajectory of policy debate over the Rudd term would be set by this decision, 
as the Global Financial Crisis put pressure on business, which in turn put pressure on 
Rudd, to limit the costs of any emissions reductions efforts.   
The formal signification of this pivot would come in late 2008, as Rudd climate 
change advisor Ross Garnaut published a white paper which itself represented a 
compromise proposal, and which the government further weakened. For example, 
Garnaut urged that the government seek to reduce the output of greenhouse gasses by 
between 5-to-15 percent by 2020, in relation to 2000 levels. However, while the Rudd 
government accepted this recommendation, it rejected Garnaut’s associated argument that 
it should consider a 25 percent cut if the upcoming Copenhagen summit produce a global 
accord on these levels. Reflecting their attention to the ‘bottom line’ in the context of the 
accelerating GFC, they also rejected Garnaut’s urging that industry compensation be 
limited, opting to distribute 25 percent of proposed permits to emitting companies facing 
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international competition from rivals whose governments had not yet imposed such 
constraints (Taylor and Uren 2010, pp. 177-178; Curran 2011, pp. 1010-1011). In this 
technocratic manner, Garnaut and Rudd each remained within the EM framework. 
However, this decision would set in play a dynamic that would only exacerbate 
the gap between Rudd’s ‘outside’ rhetoric and ‘inside’ policymaking, requiring that 
Labor increasingly appease the Liberals and their business constituents. Given business 
pressures arising from the GFC – and the alienation of those who had hoped for an accord 
with the Greens – Climate Change Minister Penny Wing suggested in May 2009 that 
Labor risked an ‘outcome where loss of support from the left and the right, for totally 
different reasons, meant you ended up with nothing. This would lead her to engage in 
behind-the-scenes talks (on the right) with the Business Council of Australia and the 
Australian Industry Group, and (on the left) the World Wildlife Fund and Australian 
Conservation Foundation. The result would be a series of shared compromises, including 
a year’s delay in implementing the scheme, a promise to consider a 25 percent cut in 
Australia’s emissions given a possible Copenhagen deal, and increased compensation for 
key industries (Taylor and Uren 2010, p. 181).  
Yet, over the next six months, Labor would face a similar dilemma to that of 
Wilson: Just as Wilson had dealt with Republican ‘irreconcilables,’ Rudd had to deal 
with a revived skepticism toward climate change emanating from within the Liberal 
Party. To be sure, Howard had supported a strengthened policy in the campaign, and his 
environmental minister Malcolm Turnbull would go on to continue in this vein as the 
Liberals moved into opposition. Indeed, in May 2009, Turnbull even engineered coalition 
support for Rudd’s planned position at the forthcoming Copenhagen summit, endorsing a 
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5 percent unconditional emissions target and setting conditions for agreements of up to 
25 percent. Yet, into late 2009, the Coalition would increasingly question both the 
science behind climate change and – reviving the ‘No Regrets’ stance – the wisdom of 
staking out a position prior to Copenhagen, with Liberal Tony Abbott arguing explicitly 
that the ‘politics have changed’ and that electoral imperatives justified efforts to draw 
sharper distinctions with Labor on climate change (Taylor and Uren 2010, p. 189). The 
key pivot came in December 2009, when Turnbull – having been weakened by a bizarre 
scandal over a forged e-mail alleging corruption on the part of Rudd – was deposed in 
favor of Abbott. On his first day as leader, Abbott submitted a secret ballot pulling back 
Liberal support for an ETS – overwhelmingly approved on a 54-29 vote – and then went 
on to deride it as a ‘great big new tax on everything’ (Taylor and Uren 2010, p. 196). 
Having come to face a mounting domestic gap between promises and 
transactional possibilities, Rudd – weakened by the divisions in parliament – would in 
turn face similar tensions abroad, as the Copenhagen summit commenced a month after 
Abbott’s rise to lead the opposition. In the approach to Copenhagen, rapidly developing 
nations – most importantly China, India, Brazil and South Africa – would increasingly 
argue that the summit was moving to unfairly restrict their growth – in ways that had not 
previously constrained now-developed states (Alter 2010, p. 359). Manifesting this 
skepticism, the Chinese government in particular often sent low-ranked officials to key 
meetings, which would then often be slowed when the officials would not only leave to 
seek advice, but also often return with instructions to further dilute any potential 
agreement (Taylor and Uren 2010, p. 200). With Rudd on the sidelines, U.S. President 
Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arguably ‘crashed’ a meeting of the 
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Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and South African heads of state. However, even after these 
efforts, they would be unsuccessful in obtaining concrete commitments from China – 
only tentative support for the voluntary listing of emission targets and results on an 
international registry (Alter 2010, p. 360-361). In Australia, Abbott would treat the 
collapse as a ‘vindication’ (Taylor and Uren 2010, p. 202). 
Rudd followed up on difficulties at the 2009 Copenhagen conference – and two 
unsuccessful attempts to pass the bill – by opting in April 2010 to defer a vote on an 
emissions trading scheme to 2013. To the extent that he might have called a ‘double 
dissolution’ election and sought the support of a new parliament, this further damaged his 
credibility with supporters of climate change. In this context, as his poll ratings began to 
fall – from admittedly impressive high numbers – his opponents in the party itself would 
turn on him, and by late July, he would be deposed by his own caucus (Cassidy 2010, pp. 
49-50). In a way that mirrored Wilson, the very ‘outside’ skills that made Rudd an 
effective ‘rhetorical prime minister’ worked against him when he had to compromise in 
playing the ‘inside game’ of politics. However, as with Wilson, Rudd’s rhetoric would 
retain a life of its own, and so when his successor Julia Gillard assembled a minority 
government in September 2010, her need for support from the Greens led her to reverse 
her own campaign pledge to oppose a carbon tax, enabling the eventual passage of a 
carbon tax and ETS scheme.  
 
V. Conclusions 
This analysis has both theoretical and policy implications: First, in theoretical 
terms, to the extent that it rests less on unique features of the U.S. order than pervasive 
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tensions arising from the social distribution of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966) 
or between the public and technical spheres of rhetoric (Goodnight 1982) it has relevance 
across international and comparative contexts. Indeed, given that Wilson was Tulis’ 
paradigmatic example of a president who reached out to the public over other institutions 
of government, our ‘least similar’ case highlights the ways in which rhetorical norms 
transcend formal institutional structures, shaping the practices of presidents and prime 
ministers alike. To be sure, this analysis should not be mistaken for a fatalistic one. 
Indeed, it instead can also be seen as highlighting the ways in which rhetorical appeals 
that face early setbacks can also generate later payoffs – as the rhetoric of Rudd and 
Wilson would shape the efforts of their successors. 
Secondly, this analysis suggests the need for a wider perspective on the sources of 
intellectual or populist excesses, and the overlooked ways intellectual partisanship can 
impede policy efficiency. To be sure, even as scholars have often noted the existence of 
tensions between rhetorical appeals and technocratic practicalities, these tensions are 
often seen from an intellectually partisan vantage. Yet, as Goodnight (1982, 223-224) has 
argued, to the extent that ‘the public sphere is being steadily eroded by… technical 
groundings of argument’, the public stock of shared knowledge ‘may be disappearing’. 
Ironically, in recent scholarship such trends to a devaluing of the public sphere are often 
heralded. Such intellectual partisanship can be found in not only Tulis’s arguments, but 
also International Relations work on the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’, which casts leaders 
as – at best – intervening agents who translate intellectual frameworks into policy reality 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In contrast, our analysis suggests that norm entrepreneurs 
must themselves adjust to moral sentiments, and that excessive intellectual autonomy – or 
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Krause’s (2008, p. 2) ironic ‘fear about affect’ – can exacerbate instability. In this way, 
the presidential or prime ministerial context of debate matters less than shifts in the social 
distribution of knowledge that foreshadow tendencies to populist excess or intellectual 
partisanship. 
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